The thesis of this paper is that Keynes wrote A Treatise on Probability in opposition to the frequentist theory of probability, systematised by John Venn, which denied any role for probability in decision theory. Keynes was interested in finding an alternative conception of probability that could be utilised as a guide of life. To analyse this point, the paper considers Keynes's criticisms of frequentist tradition in the two versions of his Fellowship dissertation, and in the published edition of his Treatise. Keynes's project is then illustrated with the famous example of whether or not to go out with one's umbrella in the situation in which the pressure is high and the clouds are black.
Introduction
A central question in the literature on probability and uncertainty in Keynes's thought is the extent to which, in his later economic writings, he remained wedded to the views first expressed in his A Treatise on Probability (Keynes, 1921: hereinafter, TP) . A great deal has been written on this subject, drawing on a wide variety of published sources and manuscripts, by both Keynes and others. The subject has been dealt with within the context of a multiplicity of very different research areas, including the relationship between the TP and ethical-philosophical discussion and developments in decision theory.
The context that has perhaps been most overlooked is the tradition of analysis of the theory of probability which preceded Keynes. Much has been written on the classification of the TP in twentieth-century developments of the theory of probability, and it has often also been argued that the TP represents a radical break with the British frequentist tradition. But what I consider to be the crucial point of the correct placing in context and overall interpretation of the TP has yet to be adequately dealt with. To show what I mean, I shall use the reconstruction by Bateman (1996, pp. 40 ff.) .
Bateman shows that the TP finds its origin in Keynes's reflections on George E. Moore's Principia Ethica and, in particular, his view that the weak point of Moore's argument lies in its treatment of probability. Bateman shows that, in an unpublished paper of 1904, 'Ethics in Relation to Conduct', 1 Keynes not only clearly identifies the type of probability implied in Moore's arguments, but also suggests a first line of critical reflection-which probably originated in an intuition unsupported by systematic reflection on the nature of probability, seeing that, according to the available evidence, Keynes at the time had not done any systematic reading on the theory of probability. The type of probability implied in Moore's argumentation is frequentist: probability is defined in reference to events that occur repeatedly. In contrast, Keynes's critical line of reflection suggested an epistemic conception of probability: 'A statement of probability always has reference to the available evidence and cannot be refuted or confirmed by subsequent events' (Keynes, 1904 , quoted in Bateman, 1996 .
In 1906, Keynes began working on his dissertation, which he finished in December 1907. In this dissertation, entitled The Principles of Probability, we find a new theory of probability which made it possible to solve the problem of coherence identified three years earlier in Moore's work. In Bateman's reconstruction, this solution passes through the reconversion to Moore's naïve realism, as regards the philosophical foundation of the notion of probability.
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My reasoning is as follows. Moore's ethics represent the starting point and perhaps also the finishing line of Keynes's reflections on probability. But when Keynes came up against the analytical tradition in the theory of probability, he had to submerge himself in an extensive literature in which decision theory under uncertainty represented a legitimate topic of discussion. Moreover, Keynes was working within a theoretical context which, in Britain, was dominated by the frequentist tradition. This tradition had originated in the contributions by Robert Leslie Ellis (1844) and Antoine Augustin Cournot (1843), and had been developed and systematised by John Venn in The Logic of Chance, 3 and partially corrected and improved by Francis Ysidro Edgeworth and Karl Pearson. Venn's book was the most influential text in the British context, as Keynes himself recognised (TP, pp. 84, 92, 433 ).
Moore's allusion to frequentist theory revealed all of its limitations. In Venn's strict systematisation, the frequentist tradition not only drastically limited the notion of probability, but also denied to it any sort of utility in decision theory. Keynes, instead, argued in favour of the practical relevance of probability, on the grounds of its being rational to be guided by probability in action:
The importance of probability can only be derived from the judgement that it is rational to be guided by it in action; and a practical dependence on it can only be justified by a judgement that in action we ought to act to take some account of it. It is for this reason that probability is to us the 'guide of life '. (TP, p. 323) Keynes's problem was, therefore, not so much that of finding an alternative probability to the one just mentioned in Moore's text, but rather of finding an alternative theory of probability that could be used as a guide to action.
At the base of the argument that follows is that, when Keynes began to study probability, he entered a disciplinary logic that was different from the one that had hitherto prevailed. This means that the origins and meaning of the terms used in the TP must be considered with an eye to a research tradition which, in the extensive discussion on uncertainty in Keynes, has so far remained in the background.
The purpose of this paper is to show how Keynes compared his view of probability and belief with frequentist theory. To this end, I shall examine Keynes's criticism of frequentist theory in the two versions of his dissertation (1907 and 1908 hereinafter, respectively PP1 and PP2) , and the edition of TP published in 1921. From this reconstruction, several fundamental points emerge which are also useful in clarifying the Keynesian approach to probability and decision under uncertainty. In the final section, I shall discuss the famous Keynesian example-that of whether or not to take one's umbrella when going outcomparing Keynes's solution with the ones derived from two different versions (those of Venn and Edgeworth) of the frequentist theory. In this way, in my opinion, the central aspect of Keynes's position may be clarified.
2. Frequentist probability in The Principles of Probability (1907) To have a thorough understanding of Keynes's position in relation to the tradition of frequentist theory of probability, it is useful to compare his two Fellowship dissertations and the final version of the TP they led up to.
We know that the failure of the first version of the dissertation was due, amongst other things, to Alfred North Whitehead's objections with regard to the treatment of the frequentist theory.
1 In the second version of December 1908, Keynes introduced a whole chapter, the sixth one, dedicated to 'the frequency interpretation of probability'. In the preface, he numbered this among the parts of the dissertation that were to be considered original (PP2, p. ii).
2 Chapter VI of the second version of his dissertation was to be found almost in its entirety in Chapter VIII of TP, entitled 'The Frequency Theory of Probability'.
In PP1, criticisms of the theories of probability are concentrated in the Appendix to Chapter I (PP1, pp. 15-28). Some six highly critical pages, dedicated to frequentist theory (PP1, , open as follows:
the English school have [sic] suffered even more from idiosyncrasy. They have entirely lost sight for all practical purposes of the relational nature of the conception. Under the aegis of an empirical philosophy they have sought in probability a quality belonging to the entities of phenomenal experience and have imagined that events have probabilities just as men belong to nations. This realist view has been one of the most dangerous of delusions in the past and is not even now eradicated from English philosophy. (PP1, p. 18; italics added) There are, thus, two points of critical attack. The first, namely that frequency theory is associated with empiricism, is not a new one. The objection is the same one that Keynes raised in respect of Moore's reasoning in the 1904 paper recalled earlier. But the second point is a new one, and presupposes a substantial modification to Keynes's position on frequency theory. In his criticism of Moore, Keynes was thinking generically about the difficulty of using ill-grounded probability for decision theory. In PP1, however, he had come to recognise that it was not possible to apply a coherent version of the frequentist theory to decision theory. By this stage, Moore is already far from view. We have entered a logic that is internal to the theory of probability and to its instrumental use for the purposes of a normative theory of decision.
Keynes's exposition of the frequentist theory makes use of an extensive assembly of quotations taken from the third edition (1888) of Venn's The Logic of Chance (PP1, pp. 20-1).
1 At the end of these quotations, which neatly summarise Venn's book, Keynes wrote: 'How unsatisfactory all this is!' (PP1, p. 21). He then concludes, a little further on: 'The Logic of Chance seems to me to be, in detail, a tissue of confusion' (PP1, p. 24).
In substance, Keynes offered two arguments-which turned up again in different contexts in subsequent texts-in support of his dissatisfaction. The first is in respect of the definition procedures used to arrive at the reference series-a problem that Venn had discussed at length, solving it with reference to inter-subjectively shared practical selection procedures-by identifying series that were neither too large nor too limited!-and to common sense. The second argument concerned the general meaning of probability in The Logic of Chance. It is worthwhile dwelling on this, because its illustration demonstrates that in 1907 Keynes had not fully understood the logic of Venn's reasoning.
In Venn and, in general, in a correct frequentist theory, probability is the relative frequency of events of a certain type within the domain-'series', in Venn's terminologyselected for the study. The affirmation that probability can be attributed to an event on the basis of the probability value that refers to the class of events in which it is included is meaningless (Venn, 1888, pp. 142, 150-1; Cohen, 1989, p. 48) . To use Venn's words, 'the employment of Probability postulates ignorance of the single event' (Venn, 1888, p. 142) .
To clarify these ideas, it may be useful to resort to the following symbolism: P(R,A) ¼ p, where: A indicates the aleatory experiment that is being performed or the domain selected for the study; R indicates the result of the experiment or the quantity of cases that present a certain modality; the proportion of cases with result R is approximated-with a certain margin of error-at p; this proportion is called the statistical probability of R in A. In this case, the probability is essentially dyadic, requiring a reference class (A). Furthermore, the probability is relative, not to the individuals belonging to the class, but to the frequency of the modality R assumed by certain individuals within the class.
To further clarify the point, it may be useful to resort to the example of drawing of balls from a box, the contents of which are unknown. After many draws, we are able to establish the following probability value: 30% of the balls extracted are red. From this probability value, the frequentist theory enables me to make the following inference: if I extract a large number of balls from the box-putting them back into the box-30% of them will be red. But I am not allowed to infer the probability of having a red ball as a result of the next draw. In terms of our symbols, let r2R be one of the elementary events that enjoys the R property; within the frequentist theory, the implication relationship is not valid: if (P(R,A) ¼ p and r2R), then P(r) ¼ p.
Keynes correctly noted that the nature of frequentist probability is dyadic, but did not seem fully to understand the type of affirmations that it is capable of justifying. In fact, he wrote, 'probability, on this theory too, is not a quality of an event but a relation between an individual and a series; and to say that an event is probable without saying to what series we are relating it is meaningless' (PP1, p. 21). And then, further on, 'when the occurrence of an event is asserted to be probable, this precisely means, according to him [Venn n.d.r.] that the event is one of a certain series. An assertion of probability is thus merely a kind of assertion of truth.' (PP1, pp. 23-4).
The two sentences are correct only when the necessary specification is added that the event of which we are speaking is not an individual event, but a class of events with a particular characteristic, within a larger class of events.
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The impression one gets from a reading of PP1 is that Keynes did not understand this fundamental specification. The first of the two sentences quoted above seems to suggest that the probability of an individual event is determined by the relative frequency that the modality of that event assumes in the reference series. That is, Keynes believed that Venn supported the validity of the aforesaid implication. In the terms of our example, Keynes believed that Venn contended that there was a 0.3 probability of obtaining a red ball in the following draw.
The impossibility of making inferences of this type is the fundamental reason why frequentist probability is inapplicable to decision theory under uncertainty. The underlying intuition is as follows: choices often involve assigning probabilities to individual events. But if probabilities cannot be applied to individual events, then they cannot be used to guide choice, at least in cases in which the choice involves random events. This intuition is at the basis of Edgeworth's critical comments (Baccini, 1997 (Baccini, , 2001 , and is one of the most important critical points which, according to de Finetti, distinguish his theory of probability from the frequentist one (e.g., de Finetti, 1995, p. 63) .
2 In 1907, Keynes, engaged in criticism of the empiricist foundation of the frequentist theory, failed to notice this fundamental point against it.
3. Frequentist probability in The Principles of Probability (1908) and in A Treatise on Probability (1921) One year later, in the second version of his dissertation, Keynes's negative attitude towards the empiricist foundation of the frequentist theory became less important: 'Venn's exposition is much coloured by an empirical view of logic, which is not perhaps as necessary to the essential part of his doctrine as he himself supposed.' (PP2, p. 101; TP, p. 92). The second critical point, however, the one about the practical uselessness of frequentist probability, took on a central role.
Before indicating in peremptory terms the point already raised one year earlier, Keynes considered it necessary to redefine his research programme on probability, by comparing it explicitly with Venn's viewpoint:
It is useless [ . . . ] for a critic of Venn to point out that many supposed judgements of probability are not concerned in any way with statistical frequency; for, as I understand the Logic of Chance, this is admitted; and the critic must show that the sense different from Venn's in which the term probability is often employed has an important logical interpretation. This position I shall endeavour to establish. It is, in my opinion, this other sense alone which has importance; Venn's theory by itself has few practical applications, and if we allow it to hold the field, we must admit that probability is not the guide of life, and that in following it we are not acting according to reason. (PP2, p. 104; TP, p. 96) Criticism of the frequentist theory assumed a central role in Keynes's research programme. He wanted to construct a new logic of probability, radically different from the frequentist one, for the purpose of rehabilitating it as a guide of life (PP2, p. 125; TP, p. 109). We shall consider this point more generally a little further on, but must first follow Keynes's reasoning.
To give a brief explanation of Venn's position, Keynes reproduced the same quotations that he had used in 1907. However, he replaced the concluding exclamation (quoted above) with a summary of Venn's thought that corrected the interpretative error of 1907. In reality, he continued to define probability ambiguously, again utilising the term 'event' without specifying its meaning: 'To say that the probability of an event's having a certain charateristic is x/y is to mean that the event is one of a number of events, a proportion x/y of which have the characteristic in question' (PP2, p. 102; TP, p. 94). But differently from the preceding year, he devoted an entire page to illustrating this definition (PP2, p. 103; TP, pp. 94-5), explicitly recognising that one of the two basic principles-the other is the experiential foundation-of Venn's theory consisted of the fact that probability deals with series or groups of events, for which it is possible to identify aggregate regularities and individual differences. For this reason, 'we can make statement regarding the average of a certain class or regarding its characteristics in the long run which we cannot make about any of its individual members without great risk of error ' (PP2, p. 103; TP, p. 95) .
Once the underlying principles of the frequentist theory were clarified, Keynes could begin his criticism, which was divided among several points already raised by other commentators.
The first point regarded the significance of the term 'probability' which, in the accepted frequentist meaning, represented a 'grave departure from the established use of words' which ended up eliminating 'a great number of judgements which are generally believed to deal with probability' from the domain of the theory (PP2, p. 104; TP, p. 95). However, the point was not, as might be believed, a reference to conventions. Keynes added, in fact, that Venn explicitly proposed to give a precise definition and, therefore, to delimit the domain of probability. The point is the contraposition to the limits imposed by Venn's logic, of a different logic of probability than that which is often implied in common use of the term. 1 For Venn, probability was nothing more than a method for correctly dealing with statistical frequency (PP2, p. 105; TP, p. 96). It was not a logic of induction, nor a logic of modality: that is, it was not a logic of judgements that are 'only probable'. Venn's radical construction can be explained in relation to the need to eliminate every consideration of a subjective or psychological type from the domain of probability (PP2, p. 106; TP, p. 97). Venn attained this objective by founding the theory of probability on knowledge through experience, in particular on the particular form of experiential knowledge relative to a series of events.
As we have seen, not only did Keynes not accept Venn's solution, but he also believed that the critical point at the origin of The Logic of Chance was not applicable to his probability theory. It was valid only in relation to those who defined probability as a measurement of the degree of subjective belief (PP2, p. 106; TP, p. 97). In Keynes's construction Probability is *a proper name for* the study of the grounds which lead us to entertain a rational preference for one belief over another. [ . . . ] For *this essay* §my Treatise § is concerned with the general theory of arguments from premises leading to conclusion which are reasonable but not In this sense, Venn's theory cannot be considered as an alternative to that of Keynes. On the contrary-and this is the greatest innovation compared to the 1907 text-a suitably rewritten frequentist theory can be considered to be a particular case of Keynes's theory of probability (TP, p. 104).
The correct frequentist theory
To understand this paradoxical affirmation, it is useful to clarify our ideas on several basic characteristics of Keynes's theory with respect to which we can then discuss the revised and corrected version of the frequentist theory.
As we have already seen implicitly in several of the previous quotations, Keynes considered probability to be a degree of rational belief that was always included between impossibility (probability equal to zero) and certainty (probability equal to one) (e.g., TP, p. 38). To make reference to a degree of rational belief necessarily means shifting the domain of probability from facts to the propositions. Probability-that is, uncertain rational belief-is always defined in relation to an established corpus of knowledge. Every proposition is probable or improbable with reference to a given corpus of knowledge: 'No proposition is in itself either probable or improbable, just as no place can be intrinsically distant.' (TP, p. 7)
Its domain is represented by the relationships between two groups of propositions, premises-i.e., the established corpus of knowledge-and conclusions. Therefore, this is a probability with an essentially dyadic character, and is a logical probability.
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To clarify our ideas once more, it may be useful to represent Keynesian probability by the following formula: P k (a|h) ¼ p k , in which h is the aggregate of the premises-or the relevant corpus of knowledge-and a is the conclusion; P k indicates the degree in which the premises h imply conclusion a. By means of this schema, Keynes placed the notion of belief at the centre of his theory, rendering it indissolubly linked to that of probability. In fact, in Keynes's theory, probability indicates a degree of rational belief. Keynes maintained that there could be a probabilistic relation of p k degree between a and h if and only if the knowledge of h justifies a rational belief in a of degree p k : 'Given as our basis what knowledge we actually have, the probable [ . . . ] is that which it is rational for us to believe. This is not a definition. For it is not rational for us to believe that the probable is true; it is only rational to have a probable belief in or to believe it in preference to alternative beliefs' (TP, p. 307).
To demonstrate that a correct frequentist theory is a special case of his general logic of probability, Keynes embarked on some complex reasoning, in which Whitehead and William Ernest Johnson must have played an important part.
To accomplish the rewriting, Keynes had to distance himself from Venn's foundations. The distancing consisted of three points: (i) that no necessary link exists between relative frequencies and logical empiricism (knowledge through experience); (ii) that the domain of probability consists of propositions, and not of things (Venn's series are learned experientially); (iii) that probability does not coincide with the relative frequency learned through experience, but that probability values can be based on statements of frequency.
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The last-mentioned point is the central one. The frequentist theory proposed by Keynes can be expressed as follows: let q be a proposition, the truth condition of which is unknown; let Q be the class of propositions to which q belongs; let a be the proportion of true propositions in Q, and b the proportion of false propositions in Q, so that: aþb ¼ 1. Proportion a is the truth-frequency in Q. The probability that proposition q belonging to Q is true then coincides with the truth-frequency a. To continue with the previous notation, the probability that proposition q is true, given the knowledge (h) of the truth-frequency of the propositions belonging to class Q, coincides with the truth-frequency in Q, namely P k (q|h) ¼ P k (q|a) ¼ a. 'The fundamental tenet of a frequency theory of probability is, then, that the probability of a proposition always depends upon referring it to some class whose truth-frequency is known within wide or narrow limits. [ . . . ] the probabilities are relative, not to our knowledge, but to some objective class, possessing a perfectly definite truth-frequency, to which we have chosen to refer them' (TP, pp. 101-2).
In summary, Keynes rewrote the frequency theory in such a way as to be able to consider it as a particular case of his probability theory: 'the theory of this Treatise is the generalised theory, comprehending within it such applications of the idea of statistical truth-frequency as have validity' (TP, p. 104). It was a particular case in the sense that it was a probability derived in the presence of a particular type of premise, which consisted of a verification of the truth-frequency of propositions.
A fundamental critical point implicit within this reasoning leads us to the centre of one of the keenest debates on Keynes's theory of probability. Here is an illustration.
Let us apply Keynes's version of the frequency theory to establish the probability that the following assertion is true: 'I drew a yellow ball from the box'. The information available to me is the following: in the past, this assertion was true 30% of the time. Keynes believed that, in these conditions, there was a 0.3 probability that the assertion 'I drew a yellow ball from the box' was true. That is, he believed that it was possible to induce the probability of the truth of a proposition from the knowledge of the truth-frequency. That is, it is rational to derive a probable belief relative to the truthful condition of a proposition from the knowledge of the truth-frequency.
Probability theory is not able to justify this critical passage: why, in the same conditions, should I not be certain of the truth (or falsity) of the affirmation? This is a problem that can be solved only in reference to some general philosophical ideas. In my opinion, Keynes solved the problem by appealing to rational intuition (Pasquinelli, 1994, p. XI): it is rational intuition that guarantees the existence of 'real and objective' relations between premises and conclusions in probabilistic reasoning (e.g., TP, p. 5). And it is rational intuition that lets us derive the probability of a conclusion from the premise constituted by a truth-frequency.
Keynes was aware that, even when appropriately modified, the frequentist theory of probability continues to suffer from several of the problems identified in The Logic of Chance.
2 In particular, questions regarding the reference series continue to be problematic 1 'In the first place, it does not regard probability as being identical with statistical frequency, although it holds that all probabilities must be based on statements of frequency, and can be defined in terms of them. It accepts the theory that propositions rather than events should be taken as the subject-matter of probability; and it adopts the comprehensive view on the subject according to which it includes induction and all other cases in which we believe that there are logical grounds for preferring one alternative out of a set none of which are certain. Nor does it follow Venn in supposing any special connection to exist between a frequency theory of probability and logical empiricism' (TP, p. 101).
2 He dedicated the second part of chapter VI of PP2 and chapter VIII of TP to these problems.
and probably unsolvable (PP2, p. 155). In fact, to define a reference series, it is necessary to resort to criteria external to the theory of probability, thereby necessitating the introduction of spurious elements into the theory. According to Keynes, the conventional rule suggested by Venn-to choose reference series that were neither too large nor too limitedwas not useful for overcoming the difficulty. It results in the paradox of considering series that are so limited as to include only a single element, the one that is being analysed, the only one to have characteristics that are completely similar to itself-and in any case makes reference to knowledge external to the probability theory which introduces elements of complication into the theory. 4. Should I go out with my umbrella?
We are now in a position to tackle the problem that we set ourselves at the beginning of this study, i.e., the relationship between the theory of probability and the theory of decision under uncertainty. The central critical point raised by Keynes in regard to frequentist probability was that it had no relation to decision-making under uncertainty. In Baccini (2001) , I demonstrated the logical impossibility of a decision theory under uncertainty within a frequentist theory of probability, by reporting the difference between Venn's and Edgeworth's positions. The central assumption on which Venn's reasoning is based is that man acts on the basis of his beliefs. Belief is formed with reference to complex sets of information, and human psychology plays an important part in the process. No necessary connection exists between probability and belief. Probability is not the logic of partial belief; therefore, no relationship exists between probability and action.
From 1908, Keynes's main criticism of the frequentist theory was that it cannot be used as a guide in making decisions. The criticism of Moore's empiricism was less important than the criticism of Venn's theory: the central issue was not to amend probability so as to reduce its empirical connotations, but to rebuild it, so as to make it useful for decision theory. From this point of view, in Keynes the connection between probability, rational belief and action is direct. Keynes seems to have proceeded in his reasoning with a sort of Bain-style assumption, 2 to have a belief signifies being disposed to act on the basis of it: 'To believe one thing in preference to another, as distinct from believing the first true or more probable and the second false or less probable, must have reference to action and must be a loose way of expressing the propriety of acting on one hypothesis rather than on another. We might put it, therefore, that the probable is the hypothesis on which it is rational for us to act' (TP, p. 307). Belief is the criterion for action; probability is the logic of partial belief, and is therefore the logic of rational action. In this way, Keynes correctly re-established the connection between probability, belief and action, by re-appropriating Butler's formula: 'To us probability is the very guide of life' (TP, p. 309).
What we have seen up to this point is well illustrated by a famous example introduced in the TP in a discussion of the measurability of probability. The hypothesis is that one must go out; the barometer indicates high pressure, but the clouds are black. Is probability useful in deciding whether or not to take one's umbrella?
The example is interesting, because it is discussed explicitly by Edgeworth within a sui generis frequentist context and also because, in view of its simplicity, it is not difficult to deal with within Venn's system.
We shall in fact begin with the latter. To be dealt with in Venn's terms, the example must be rewritten as follows. Above all, it is essential that observations exist-for a fairly long period of time-on the basis of which it is possible to establish two reference series: the first measures the frequency of the rain when there is high pressure; the second, when there are black clouds. We therefore have two frequency values for the rain, in connection with different observations, which may or may not be divergent. The problem is to choose a reference series, a problem that is completely exterior to the theory of probability. Once this problem has been resolved, perhaps by choosing to consider the series with a greater number of observations, let us say the one relative to rain and black clouds, the probability of rain can be established. No necessary connection exists between the frequency that it will rain and the agent's belief about whether or not it will rain. In fact, the belief of the agent may derive from considerations that are different from the frequency values. Since it is belief which determines the choice as to whether or not to take one's umbrella, it can be affirmed that-except in extreme cases, when an agent must choose only on the basis of information about the frequency-probability is of no help in making the decision.
Edgeworth's position was, if possible, even more radical. 1 Let us suppose that we have sufficient statistical evidence for an optimal determination as to the (frequency) probability of rain. For simplicity's sake, let us suppose that the probability of rain is much greater than the probability of no rain. Edgeworth's theory guarantees that credibility of rain is greater than credibility of no rain. An agent acts according to her belief, but, according to Edgeworth, credibility is not necessarily translated into belief. So no connection exists between the judgement of credibility, derived deductively from probability value, and the decision to act which, instead, refers to belief. Even in the face of optimal statistical evidence, therefore, all the alternatives remain. Only in the case in which credibility becomes belief, i.e., when the statistical evidence is so strong that it gives rise on its own to belief, will the choice then be made on the basis of the credibility-and, therefore, probability-values. In all the other cases, the agent will decide whether or not to take his/her umbrella in an idiosyncratic manner, while yet knowing the correct value of the probability that it will rain. Lastly, we come to Keynes (TP, p. 30) . The example serves to illustrate the two cases in which probability values are not useful as a guide to action. The first case occurs if the agent is not able to attribute a precise probability value to the event, or when it is not possible to establish the probability of rain. This may occur for two reasons: (i) because there is no certain evidence that makes it possible to establish the premises for an assertion of probability; (ii) because it is not possible to derive from the available premises an affirmation of probability, precisely because of a 'lack of skill in arguing from given evidence' (TP, p. 31).
The second case occurs if the agent is not able to order the probability values of alternative events-or when the probabilities can be ordered only partially. In the specific case, the agent is able to establish the probability of 'rain' on the basis of the 'black clouds' premise, and the probability of 'no rain' on the basis of the 'high pressure' premise; but he cannot make comparisons between the two probabilities, because his conclusions are based on different sets of knowledge.
In both cases, it is impossible to judge the various alternatives rationally, because the criterion of choice is arbitrary: 'If the barometer is high, but the clouds are black, it is not always rational that one should prevail over the other in our minds, or even that we should balance them, though it will be rational to allow caprice to determine us and to waste no time on the debate' (TP, p. 30).
Let us now attempt to make the reasoning once again within the terms of frequentist probability as corrected by Keynes. Let us take the first case: the absence of a probability value. If the probability is established on the basis of truth-frequencies, the absence of a probability value can occur only if observations do not exist on the basis of which the truth-frequency of an affirmation can be established. With truth-frequencies, it does not seem to be sensible to think about lack of reasoning-the second reason for not being able to assign a probability noted above. In fact, we have seen that a very simple operative rule exists for the construction of probability: if a truth-frequency exists, then it coincides with probability. Returning to the example: probability may possibly not exist, because it is impossible to have access to sets of evidence on the basis of which it is possible to establish the truth-frequency of the proposition: 'the pressure is high and the clouds are black and it is raining'.
The second case, that of probabilities which cannot be compared, can be illustrated as follows. Let there be two truth-frequencies, the first of which is relative to the proposition: 'there is high pressure and it is raining', and the second, to the proposition: 'there are black clouds and it is raining'. In these optimal conditions, application of the rule allows us to have two numerical probability values. However, they cannot be compared, because they make reference to two different premises (h). We find ourselves in the situation in which probabilities can be only partially ordered. In this case, it is the non-comparability of the two probability values that prevents us from utilising probability as a criterion for action. The critical point is the choice of one of the two probability values: thus, in the case of Keynes, the weight of the available evidence becomes relevant.
Therefore, by rewriting the Keynesian example in terms of truth-frequencies, we are able to identify the two cases, which do not enable us to use probability as a criterion of rational choice.
1 In all the other conditions-if truth-frequencies exist that make it possible to measure probability values precisely, or if it is possible at least to completely order the probabilities-probability is the rational criterion of the action.
The distance that separated Keynes from the frequentist tradition can be measured on the basis of what has just been said. If the Keynesian agent were to be in the ideal condition put forward by Venn or Edgeworth, i.e., if s/he knew the probability value, probability would be the criterion of his/her action. Probability is the criterion of rational choice: once a probability value is known, a value of rational belief is determined on the basis of which the agent decides on alternative courses of action. This is what the frequentist tradition insisted on denying. And this is the radical interpretation that Keynes found himself having to oppose as soon as he made 1 Here is a third case in which we are unable to use probability as a criterion of choice. We have two statements regarding the same decision problem. The first statement is a measure of probability; the second is not probabilistic. The two statements are based upon different available evidence. If the knowledge regarding the non-probabilistic statement is, for some reason, better than the probabilistic one, then it is rational to act according to the non-probabilistic statement. To cite a Keynesian example: 'To a stranger the probability that I shall send a letter to the post unstamped may be derived from the statistics of the Post Office; for me those figures would have but the slightest bearing upon the question' (TP: 322). In the example, according to Keynes, it is easy to forget the 'more vague though more important' knowledge because of the attractiveness and definiteness of the probability statement. And this explains why, on many occasions, results drawn from the observation of statistical regularity are applied to individual cases. Edgeworth (1922, pp. 278 ) discussed a similar problem. a close examination of the allusions to probability that he had found in Moore's Principia Ethica.
Concluding considerations
The history reconstructed in this paper contains several ideas, of which I should like to highlight three. The first two concern the contextualisation and then the overall interpretation of Keynes's TP. The third involves more general considerations on the applicability of the probability theory to decision theory under uncertainty.
The first line of reflection is the following. We know that Keynes arrived at the theory of probability starting from his reflections on Moore's Principia Ethica. We have seen that when he began to study probability, Keynes's problem was no longer that of criticising Moore's naïve frequentism, but of constructing a probability theory that made it possible to consider probability as a guide to action. In fact, the successful tradition of the theory of probability in Great Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century-the frequentist theory systematised by Venn-had sponsored a clear-cut separation between the theory of probability and decision theory. In this sense, Venn and the frequentist theory appear to be the main point of reference for the critical reasoning of TP. In the text, we have shown how Keynes's criticism passed from generic and superficial accusations of Venn's theory-the ones contained in PP1-to a precise analytical reconstruction of the frequentist theory and to its reduction to a particular case of the logical probability in TP.
This reconstruction suggests several new ideas in the debate over Das Maynard Keynes Problem. The criticism of the frequentist theory emphasised in this paper brings to light the image of a TP firmly anchored to the nineteenth-century debate on probability, rather than anticipating twentieth-century epistemological discussions. A precise recognition of the probabilistic sources of TP, a recognition realised only partially up to now, could bring to light in more precise manner the connection of TP with its own tradition of disciplinary research, probably leaving alone in the background the problems which subsequent readings have introduced into the reconstruction. The basic idea is that the ethical motive that led Keynes to study probability then had to give way to the logic of the disciplinary discussions within the probability theory.
Many of the observations that seem to anticipate successive epistemological and philosophical discussions may find a new interpretation in probabilistic literature prior to the TP. Just think, for example, of the topic of the weight of the arguments, which Keynes probably derived from Johannes von Kries (Fioretti, 1998) and Edgeworth; or of the relationship between the theory of probability and the logic of common sense, which we find both in Venn-we have viewed the case of the choice of a reference series-and in Edgeworth (Baccini, 2001 , p. 10 n. 13).
So, from this point of view, the TP appears to be a work belonging to a precise research tradition: the British probabilistic one of the second half of the nineteenth century, with respect to which not only the problems, but also the innovative nature of Keynes's contribution, must be identified.
A second point of reflection concerns a key interchange that emerged from the discussion of the frequentist theory: the one about the kind of inferences that are possible within the probability theory. The passage from the truth-frequency of a proposition to probable belief requires a justification external to the probability theory. That is, it requires a reference to a metaphysics of probability: in the text, we have indicated this passage with the expression 'rational intuition', which guarantees the objectivity of the probability relationship. That rational intuition is probably connected with the second conversion to Moorism described by Bateman (1996, pp. 19 ff.) .
In my opinion, these two points of reflection offer arguments in favour of the thesis that the probability theory contained in TP is of a logical type, substantially different from the anti-rationalist and anti-positivist theory that we find at the basis of subsequent works on economics.
The third and final point of reflection is of a more general nature. The history provided in this study shows in exemplary manner that the semantics of probability is not unimportant with respect to the definition of the fields in which probability can be used. Frequentist semantics forcefully denied that the probability theory could be utilised for decision theory. In our reconstruction, the new Keynesian semantics originates precisely for the purpose of salvaging probability as a guide of life. This observation on method is very close to what de Finetti maintained in regard to 'axiomatic' theories of probability. de Finetti wrote intentionally-since incorrect-the Italian word 'assiomatiche' with double t 'assiomattiche', and sustained that this imply that 'this is madness ['da matti'], i.e., getting by on air, serving no good purpose. Unless we add to the axioms everything that has more meaning, which moreover cannot come from the axioms, since they speak in abstract manner about relationships between undefined objects ' (de Finetti, 1995, p. 62) .
In its general meaning, probability has a 'concrete' substance-to use another term of de Finetti's. Its translatability into calculation and its applicability to scientific domains depend, in fact, on its conceptualisation. The question is well known to econometricians who, starting from various theories of probability, have constructed competitive theories. Instead, the problem is much less discussed by decision theory, in which probability is considered a neutral instrument. For example, the fact that many parts of the new decision theories start from probability theories with different axiomatic bases, but not with a different semantic content, is significant.
1
The final suggestion of this work is that greater attention to the semantics of probability could contribute to salvaging the concrete significance and methodological exactness of many of the current developments in decision theory.
